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THE IRANIAN ASSET NEGOTIATIONS
John E. Hoffman, Jr.*
At the outset, I owe an obligation to you and to my fellow panelists to reveal my true colors. Following the remarks of Mr. Aksen and Mr. Rhodes, you would be entitled to expect me to give
some examples of how some distressed clients entered this wonderful world of arbitration, how the scales fell from their corporate eyes, and how their problems were solved. I am going to tell a
bit of a story this afternoon. The focus of it is arbitration, but I
should tell you it is not an arbitration that occurred. The story is
of an arbitration process that was considered very seriously by
clients in an industry unaccustomed to and distrustful of arbitration. These clients nevertheless gave very serious consideration to
arbitration and indeed adopted a format for arbitrating some extremely important disputes. The only reason that the arbitration
was not conducted was that the very existence of that arbitration
system, and the possible resort to it as a means of solving these
disputes, led to the settlements now being achieved.
I also have a personal point of view on this subject that should
be revealed. It is a viewpoint colored by almost a quarter century
of litigation experience. My view is that time should be devoted
to avoiding formalized combat as well as to conducting it. Yet the
avoidance of formalized combat, whether in the context of litigation or arbitration, cannot be successful without a thorough understanding of how that combat is likely to be conducted if attempts at negotiation, mediation, or a more satisfactory
resolution fail. Efforts to avoid uneconomic, litigious warfare are
not likely to be successful unless those involved in the decisions
have a thorough understanding of the very processes they are trying to avoid.
The context of my comments this afternoon is the recent Iranian experience, which was one example of the inevitable commercial and financial disputes that have followed virtually every
instance of world turmoil in this century. Every war or revolution,
certainly those involving nations that have any kind of substantial interdependence with other countries in the world, has been
* Partner, Shearman & Sterling, New York City. LL.B. 1960, Harvard Law
School; 1955, Princeton University.
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followed by decades of litigation to sort out the disrupted relationships. When I left law school in 1960, the Cuban revolution
had just taken place. Cuba was turned on its ear and the Cuban
cases were just beginning. One of my first assignments as a starryeyed, new associate at Shearman and Sterling was to work on the
Cuban cases. One of those cases is going to be argued a week from
Monday in the United States Supreme Court. Yet after twentythree years, the Cuban assets are still frozen. No prospect for immediate or near term resolution of those problems is apparent.
Although I have not worked steadily on Cuban cases for twentythree years, that history was something that I had very much in
mind in the Iranian experience. I do not think the handling of the
Cuban cases is a productive way to solve problems. I am not suggesting that opportunities to sort out the Cuban difficulties were
missed. The Cuban experience, however, was one of the driving
factors in the Iranian negotiations, and, in fact, was one of the
arguments presented to the Iranians during the negotiations.
They took that example very much to heart because one of the
attorneys representing Iran has been representing Cuba through
all the twenty-three years. They knew very well that the experience was something they did not want to repeat. My point is that
while I feel a little disloyal to my litigating fraternity in suggesting that we should devote tremendous efforts to avoid litigation, it is only by developing a thorough understanding of these
processes, either the litigation processes described this morning or
the arbitration techniques discussed this afternoon, that the attorney can avoid getting bogged down in such affairs.
In today's world, the economics of legal practice require practitioners to seek methods of resolving or avoiding protracted conflict. No one can afford to become involved in decades of trench
warfare litigation at the hourly rates now being charged for battalions of legal talent.
Some of the experiences in the Iranian episode were quickly
followed in other situations. As soon as the Falkland Islands crisis
began, many of the concerns that arose during the Iranian experience led to activity directed at avoiding litigation. Many of the
events in the Falkland Islands crisis replicated events that occurred during the Iranian situation. The British froze Argentine
assets, and the Argentines froze British assets. Syndicated loan
payments were disrupted. The whole Falkland Island situation
had a sense of d~j& vu. Many of the same people were involved;
the same lawyers were present around the table. In fact, we had
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two negotiation rooms going at one point. The Iranian bank group
met in one room and when we finished those negotiations, we
would move to the next room to discuss the Falkland Islands. A
little later on, we had a room down the hall for Mexico. The same
scenario is occuring now with Brazil. This group of worthy debtor
countries is providing a major source of activity.
I stress the word "debtors" because the focus I have on this
situation involves money. The particular perspective that I have
comes mainly from my experience in representing international
banks who have relationships with countries or companies that
have fallen into some form of distress. Money is always involved
in these situations. Typically, every war or revolution that one
can think of in this century has been followed by substantial periods of litigation and negotiations to sort out the disruptions in
relationships.
The Iranian revolution was certainly no exception. At the time
of the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran was one of the world's
leading exporters of oil. The proceeds from these oil exports were
invested temporarily in what are commonly called Eurodollar accounts. The Eurodollar accounts are simply dollar bank accounts
in branches of banks overseas, largely in London. The seizure of
the United States embassy, and the freeze on Iranian assets imposed by the Carter Administration in response, led to an immediate disruption of the immense financial and commercial relationships between Iran and the rest of the world. My remarks
particularly focus on the disruption of the relationships between
Iran and banks both in the United States and in the rest of the
world, even though many other commercial relationships were affected. The United States and foreign banks had made very substantial loans to Iran. In addition, Iran had deposited very substantial amounts of money in foreign branches of United States
banks, principally in London, but also in Paris. Those accounts
were purported to be frozen by the Carter Administration. Very
shortly after the freeze Iran commenced litigation overseas to recover the billions of dollars on deposit in those countries. I do not
propose to dwell on the subject of the Iranian asset litigation in
the United States or overseas, but wish to move rather quickly
through that period and get to the discussion of some arbitration
possibilities.
From the outset, it was clear to everyone working on the hostage crisis that disposition of various claims between United
States companies and Iran would be an essential element in the
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resolution of the hostage dispute. No one anticipated that Iran
was going to release the hostages without a satisfactory settlement of the claims. Most of the Iranian property outside Iran was
either frozen by the executive order or tied up in the litigation
process. Although the hostage release negotiations are somewhat
beyond my topic today, I want to stress that in all of those discussions it was absolutely clear that some form of resolving the
claims without endless litigation was a necessary element in the
solution of the crisis.
An arbitration solution did come up in the context of what was
called the bank line of negotiations. Negotiations were conducted
with Iran on behalf of the United States banks for about nine
months preceding the release of the hostages. In those discussions, the subject of arbitration came up a couple of times, but
never extensively. First, the subject of the interest on frozen Iranian assets was important to the Iranian representatives. Between
the late summer and early fall of 1980, we discussed with the Iranian representatives how we might agree on what interest, if any,
would be paid on all of the frozen assets if and when they were
released. Interest rates were at virtually an all-time high in this
period. The billions of dollars tied up were earning money for
those holding the assets. The Iranians were very interested in receiving some of this return. We discussed how this interest issue
was to be resolved in the event an agreement could not be
reached on interest rates or interest periods. We concluded that it
probably would make very good sense to think about some procedure for arbitrating this issue in London, thereby drawing on the
city's resources or people with knowledge and understanding of
the world money markets to serve as arbitrators. We did not develop any particular procedure at that time, but there was evidence of a serious Iranian interest in having arbitration take place
in London on certain issues that subsequently became quite
important.
The subject of arbitration in the bank negotiations was
broached on one other occasion in November of 1980. I received a
call from one of the Iranian representatives in Germany urgently
asking for a copy of the UNCITRAL rules. I confess that at the
time I had not even heard of the UNCITRAL rules. The Iranian
representative did not say why he wanted them, and at the time
we were not talking seriously about arbitrating anything in the
bank claims. We arranged to get him a set of the rules that he
then took to Tehran. I reported the inquiry to the United States
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Government, as had been my practice on events of that nature
throughout the negotiations, but did not dwell on the request
further.
The only other area in which any thought or discussion was
given to arbitration was also incidental. In the various plans that
were discussed and drafted through the course of the bank negotiations, a package plan dealing with as many issues between Iran
and the United States as possible was considered. We did not get
into specifics on this package plan only because: (1) we regarded
the issues in the plan as beyond our competence; (2) the Treasury
and the State Department really did not want us to negotiate
such a plan; and (3) we did not have any great motivation for the
plan. We did consider, however, various possibilities of how the
United States claims might be handled outside of continued litigation in the courts. Some consideration was given to a foreign
claim settlement commission, a mixed commission, and a variety
of other approaches. None of these proposals ever advanced to
the point of any formalized drafting that was exchanged.
The issues involved in the bank negotiations were not ones traditionally arbitrated. The kinds of contracts and agreements in
the bank claims against Iran were principally loan contracts. Arbitration provisions are not placed in such agreements because
banks feel that if someone owes money, he ought to pay it and
therefore nothing is left to arbitrate. If payment is not made as
required by the contract, the bank goes to court, receives a default judgment, and seizes the borrower's assets. Banks resist arbitration because they are not experienced with the process, they
are not used to seeing arbitration provisions, and they don't like
to consider anything they do not know or understand.
In the Iranian negotiations, however, some issues that were not
traditional areas of dispute had to be resolved. Normally banks
do not wonder about the interest rate they are to pay on money
deposits. The Iranian situation, however, changed normal circumstances. The United States banks were holding immense amounts
of funds, in demand type accounts and Eurodollar accounts bearing interest. The Eurodollar accounts, held in overseas branches,
were mostly call accounts immediately available. In the ordinary
practice, a rate would be quoted by Telex every couple of days
and the interest rates were not a mystery. In this type of arrangement, no provision was made for having a one-day demand deposit frozen for fourteen months during the highest interest rates
in history. The subject of interest was an open one on which we
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could anticipate difficulty in reaching agreement. What were we
going to do if no agreement could be reached? We were already in
the courts in London, Paris, Germany, and all over the United
States. We did not like this spread out litigation and neither did
anyone else. We believed the interest issue would be well-served
by reference to people who understood the world money markets.
Therefore, we gave some attention to arbitration in London, the
center of the Eurodollar market and the place where people with
knowledge of the issues would be available.
Arbitration was not given much further consideration during
the last frantic days of trying to settle the Iranian bank claims. In
the middle of January, 1981, last-ditch efforts were underway to
devise a package or formula for solving the hostage crisis. The
Algerian mediation efforts had begun in late November. The bank
negotiations, which had been going on since the end of April, had
been merged with the Algerian negotiations. We exchanged documents, both through the Algerians and directly with the Iranians
in Germany and elsewhere. By the middle of January, the Iranian
representatives were in New York. Everyone was working frantically trying to piece this settlement together. Then, the package
that had been the subject of some two and a half months of intense work was absolutely rejected by the Iranians on January
11th, just when settlement appeared at hand. Efforts were made
to sort out the problems again and come up with some new proposals. On January 15, 1981, the Thursday before President
Carter's term ended, we were waiting for a response from the
Iranians to our latest proposal. I got a call just after lunch that
day from Lloyd Cutler and Bob Carswell at the White House who
said they had just received-or Warren Christopher had just received-a new proposal from the Iranians. It was wholly different
from everything under consideration at that time. In fact, the Iranian proposal was somewhat of a return to an earlier plan that
had been under consideration for about six months. As far as the
banks were concerned, the proposal was intended to do three
things. After having all foreign deposits unfrozen and receiving
approximately 8 billion dollars, Iran would pay off approximately
$3.5 billion worth of bank claims it recognized as valid; place another $1.5 billion in escrow for the remaining bank claims it questioned; and arbitrate all of the questionable claims.
The one thing that worried me most about the Iranian plan was
this word "arbitrate." We knew that for this plan to have a prospect of success, we would have to get a very quick acceptance
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from all of the United States banks holding these Iranian assets
voluntarily in their foreign branches. The validity of the Carter
freeze order immobilizing the accounts was open to question and
was being litigated in the courts of the countries in which the foreign branches were located. No one knew for certain who was
right on this issue. To make the hostage deal work, however, the
banks would have to release the accounts and pay them to Iran,
thereby giving up what was, in effect, security for all the loans to
Iran that were in default. This plan was asking the banks to give
up money to Iran in return for the release of the hostages. I was
concerned that requiring "arbitration" of the remaining bank
claims might scare off one or more of the banks and threaten the
prospects for success.
The story of the next ninety hours is beyond the scope of the
discussion this afternoon. The deal did get done; the plans were
put together; the Algerian agreements were signed; and the hostages were released. The basic documentation comprising the Algerian Accords had a number of references to the arbitration of
bank claims. The two principal Declarations dealt with the basic
structure of the deal and included arbitration in the United
States-Iran Arbitral Tribunal. Another document called the Undertakings, which was not released publicly at the request of the
Iranians, had provisions for resolving the remaining bank issues.
It provided, among other things, that the United States banks
and the central bank of Iran, Bank Markazi, would meet immediately to agree upon the remaining amounts owing on their claims
against each other. If an agreement was not reached within thirty
days (nobody really understood from what point the thirty days
commenced), the Undertakings provided that either party could
refer the dispute to binding arbitration by an international arbitration panel or to the Tribunal. No one knew what international
arbitration panel would be used for the banks.
Everyone expected a prompt meeting and agreement because a
lot of work had gone into sorting out the remaining claims. In an
overabundance of enthusiasm and optimism, people believed that
the arbitration provisions were never going to come into play. The
banks and Iran did meet promptly, and in a matter of days after
the hostage settlement, meetings commenced with the Bank
Markazi officials in London. The United States banks laid out
their claims and provided the rest of the figures requested by the
Iranians. As one might expect, nothing happened, and it became
clear that nothing was going to happen very soon. We had no lev-

54

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 17:47

erage to bring the Iranians to the negotiating table if they did not
want to come. The hostage crisis had provided immense pressure
for achieving some of the things that needed to be done. But, if
the Iranians did not want to negotiate these claims, how were we
going to get them to do it? Aside from their own self-interest in
resolving the situation, the Iranians would have received a substantial amount of additional money, which was their money otherwise immobilized, and interest on all the money frozen in the
United States when a settlement was reached. The only way that
we could get Iran to the negotiation table, however, was by resorting to a more formal process.
We sent a message to the Iranians in February stating that we
wanted to continue to negotiate, but at the same time we intended to propose a system for arbitrating the banks' claims if
the negotiations were unsuccessful. This formal message also did
not receive much of a response from Iran. We followed this message with an outline of an arbitration proposal, built simply on
one sentence in the Undertakings, which stated that either party
could refer a dispute to binding arbitration by an international
arbitration panel agreed upon by the parties. Because it was very
difficult to agree with the Iranians on anything, we thought that
all we could do was continue the process of making proposals and
hope that something would click. We sent an outline for an arbitration system in the form of a proposal for arbitration that they
could accept. This kind of ad hoc arbitration was done by a
bunch of pseudo-amateurs not having a great deal of experience
in arbitration, representing clients who did not have any interest
in arbitration, and dealing with another party who did not have
any interest in doing anything. We proposed, however, that we
ought to arbitrate these claims if we could not negotiate successfully. We suggested that the arbitration should take place in
London, in English, and under the UNCITRAL rules as modified
by an Exclusion Agreement under the Arbitration Act of 1979. All
of our English legal advisors recommended that we should include the Exclusion Agreement because without it we would end
up in court and not arbitrating.
Our discussions with the Iranian representatives on the arbitration system focused a great deal on the selection of the arbitrators. We proposed that three arbitrators be appointed: one appointed by the United States banks, one by the Iranians, and a
third appointed through some mutually determined process. We
discussed a variety of systems to use in picking the third member.
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We followed this general proposal with a more detailed proposal
in the form of a draft arbitration procedure telex. The final version of this draft procedure provided for the selection of a present
or retired chancery or commercial court judge of the High Court
of England as the third arbitrator. We had developed immense
respect for commercial court judges in England during the bank
claims cases. A judge handling the litigation involving the frozen
bank accounts in London, while not experienced in this area, had
a very quick grasp of the issues that were not well understood by
many people, including bankers. We agreed that the third arbitrator should be one of these judges and accordingly, we prepared
a variety of provisions for appointing such a judge as an
arbitrator.
It is probably worth the time to touch on the main points in
the arbitration proposal. First, there was no arbitration agreement. Arbitrating in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate
would pose problems in enforcing the award other than through
the procedures set up in the United States-Iranian Undertakings.
We expected trouble in taking the award elsewhere, even though
it was rendered in England, and enforcing it under the New York
Convention. We proposed to reach an agreement by sending a
telex the Iranians would accept. One United States bank would
propose the agreement and Iran would accept it. Any other bank
that wished to arbitrate could simply adhere to the agreement.
That is, such a bank would give a notice of reference to arbitration, and adhere to the existing agreement.
Second, we needed a procedural body of reference. The UNCITRAL rules were proposed for a couple of reasons, not the least
of which was political. The Iranians already had accepted the
UNCITRAL rules, and although the people with whom we were
negotiating had taken no part in that decision, one of the tricks in
getting any agreement with the Iranians is to give them an opportunity to blame someone else for something, rather than forcing
them to make a decision themselves. The central bank representatives could blame other Iranian government officials for having
gone along with the UNCITRAL rules. Everyone believed that
the UNCITRAL rules should be used, even in the absence of
much experience with them.
The choice of language was the third important issue in the
proposal. None of these agreements, other than a few foreign language documents, were in any language other than English. We
did not want to get involved in translating a lot of documents into
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Persian. Such translations, of course, have been the experience in
the Arbitral Tribunal.
In another section of the proposal, we selected London as the
situs of the arbitration; in facilities provided by the London
Court of Arbitration. Provisions on the method of choosing the
arbitrators also were included. We wanted a short form procedure
and therefore did not want the arbitration reference to include
any lengthy pleading or claim statement. As a result, we picked
up provisions from the UNCITRAL rules providing for additional
statements of claim and defense.
Compensation of the panel, another point included in the proposal, potentially involved enormous sums of money. Everyone
knew that compensating the panel with fees based on percentages
of the amounts involved could make our clients uncomfortable
very quickly. We attempted to put a cap on the compensation of
the panel. In addition, we were nervous about the use of experts.
We experienced some unpleasant situations in the European civil
litigation of the bank claims, in which it was quite common for
the courts to appoint experts. The French courts, in which the
Iranians and the banks litigated the claims on the foreign deposits, appointed "three wise men" to ascertain what Eurodollars
were. The appointed experts filed an interim report, and although
the money was paid over two years ago, the wise men are still
thinking about the nature of Eurodollars. Needless to say, we
wanted to have some input into the appointment of experts.
Finally, the enforcement provision in the proposal was designed
to pick up the existing enforcement procedures embodied in the
Algiers Accords. This was the last effort in designing an arbitration system for the bank claims. We worked on this arbitration
proposal throughout 1981. As the year was coming to a close, we
made one effort after another to get actual substantive negotiations underway on the bank claims. Every one of those efforts was
unsuccessful. We met all kinds of obstacles, many of them coming
from the United States Government, which saw the bank negotiations as a possible vehicle for getting some things that it wanted.
As the end of the year approached, time was running out for us
to do much of anything other than file our claims in the Tribunal,
something we did not want to do. There was, however, an absolute statute of limitations on claims before the Tribunal. It took a
lot of time and expense to get the claims put together and everything translated into Persian. One of the banks was preparing to
file a claim that was thousands of pages long, when, at the time,
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some of the Farsi translation services were charging $200 a page.
We had to turn our attention to getting ready, albeit reluctantly,
for the Tribunal along with the rest of the claimants. In that context, the ad hoc arbitration process for the banks expired before
it was ever invoked. One bank actually made a reference, maybe
just whimsically, or perhaps aggressively, to arbitration under the
ad hoc system. Arbitration never happened, and, in fact, I think
that particular bank may have already reached a settlement.
Thus, the first widespread attempt in the banking industry to
deal with arbitration was, largely academic. Nonetheless, developing a process for referring our disputes, whether to an ad hoc system or the Tribunal, was the only real piece of leverage to get
negotiations underway. If those negotiations are not successful,
we have every right to be in the Tribunal presenting claims
against Iran, and it will have to defend them.
I am happy to say that negotiations are going on, although
slowly; but that is the nature of negotiations with the Iranians.
The negotiations are proceeding, with real prospects for success.
Iran admitted in the Algiers Accords that it will pay the debts.
This admission, provides a piece of leverage for settlement, and I
sincerely hope we will avoid protracted litigation or arbitration of
the claims.

